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Abstract. Democracy became the preferred and consolidated form of government only in the 
twentieth century. It is not sufficient to explain this change solely by reference to rational 
motives, nor by detecting processes and leadership. A historical approach is required. The 
new historical fact that led to the change of preference from aristocratic rule to democracy is 
the capitalist revolution, which changed the manner of appropriating the economic surplus 
from violence to the market. This is the first necessary condition for democracy. The 
disappearance of the fear of expropriation, the rise of middle classes and the pressures of the 
poor or of the workers are the second, third and fourth new historical facts that opened the 
way for the transition from the liberal to the liberal-democratic regime. After these four 
conditions were fulfilled, the elites ceased to fear that they would be expropriated if universal 
suffrage was granted. Eventually, after the transition, the democratic regime became the 
rational choice for all classes. The theory presented here does not predict transitions, since 
countries often turn democratic without fully realized historical conditions, but it predicts 
democratic consolidation, since no country that has completed its capitalist revolution falls 
back into authoritarianism.  
Key words: democracy, economic development, capitalist revolution, democratic 
transition, democratic consolidation 
JEL code: N40, O1, P10 
Democracy is today the prevailing and consolidated form of government in developed 
countries and tends to be so in the middle-income countries. Democracy has become such 
strong political value that nobody challenges it. Yet, this consensus is as recent as modern 
democracy is. Advanced countries and many middle income countries became real 
democracies only in the twentieth century, when the poor and the women finally won the 
right to vote and to be elected.
1  Why did democracy become the dominant form of 
government so late historically? Why, since the Greeks, did philosophers prefer some 
form of monarchy or aristocracy to democracy? Why are democracies consolidated in   2 
some countries while not in others? Why are coups d’Etats so frequent in poor countries – 
countries that did not “complete” their capitalist revolutions?
2
There are no simple answers to these questions, but I believe to have some consistent with 
political theory and with broad historical observation, as well as with the extensive 
empirical research undertaken by other political scientists on democracy and development. 
We know that economic development and democracy are linked. We also know that in the 
historical transition from traditional to modern societies, in the capitalist revolution taking 
place in each national state, a new and large bourgeoisie gradually assumed economic and 
political dominance and, eventually, came to support democracy after rejecting it for a 
long time in name of liberalism. Thus, the capitalist class was the first ruling class to 
accept democracy. In this paper, I try to understand the reason to that, discussing why the 
capitalist class removed successively its vetoes on democracy; and I hope to explain why 
democracy turned consolidate in rich countries and in an increasing number of middle 
income countries, whereas it remained unstable in poor countries.  
  
The method I use is historical; I am interested in generalizing from empirical experience 
rather than being normative, or depending on specific processes and leadership. I look for 
new historical events that changed the social reality. I also ask for the rational motives 
behind the consolidation of democracy, but they are not considered a priori as proposes 
rational choice, but a posteriori – just as an additional explanation to the change that the 
new historical facts originated and explain.  
In this paper, I claim that the major new historical fact behind the rise of democracy was 
the “capitalist revolution” (the formation of the modern national-states and the industrial 
revolution) and the corresponding change of the form of appropriating the economic 
surplus from the control of the state to the market. After that, three subsequent historical 
facts (elites’ gradual loss of the fear of expropriation by a socialist working class wining 
elections, the pressure from the poor for more democratic participation, and the rise of 
middle classes) led economic elites to suspend their veto to democracy. We will see that 
these four historical facts explain why the bulk of democratic transitions and 
consolidations took place only in the twentieth century. Yet, in the case of democratic 
transitions, we have many exceptions to the model that I present in this paper, while, in the 
case of democratic consolidation, the occurrence of these facts are the necessary and 
sufficient condition.    3 
I know that there is not an “operational” definition of capitalist revolution – it is difficult 
to say which country did complete its capitalist revolution and already counts with a large 
business class and working class and growing professional middle class, and in which 
country economic surplus is already appropriated mainly through the market on the form 
of profits. But I don’t believe that we should ask for that in papers considering la longue 
durée. This is primarily a theoretic not an empirical paper, but I also present here the 
empirical evidence for the capitalist revolution model explaining the relation between 
economic development and democratic transition and consolidation.  
The philosophers’ view 
In the ancient world, the normative view about the good political regime was clear: it 
should be monarchic or aristocratic, not democratic. The most that philosophers could 
accept was Aristotle’s “mixed regime”, in which some aspects of democracy were 
combined with authoritarian rule. Since the philosophers’ main political objective was 
social order or security, they were either outright authoritarian, like Plato, or moderate, 
like Aristotle and Polybius, who were concerned to balance rich and poor for the sake of 
both stability and justice. Democracy alone was dangerous, subject to factions, instability 
and corruption. Today, we cannot view ancient Greek democracy as true democracy, given 
the exclusion of women and foreigners and the existence of slaves. Only many centuries 
later, with the great revolutions in France and in the United States, inspired by Greek 
democracy and especially Roman republicanism (Pocock 1975), democracy once again 
came into the minds of people as a possibility. Yet these were liberal rather than 
democratic revolutions: they gave priority to the protection of civil rights and the rule of 
law over the affirmation of political rights, particularly universal suffrage.  
Politics – the art of governing through argument and compromise, and not only by the use 
of force – reappeared in the Italian merchant city-states with the republican humanists and 
their major representative, Machiavelli. After centuries, in a particular region of the world 
the times were suitable for doing and thinking politics. Yet, with the rise of the modern 
national-states in the form of absolute monarchies, such opportunities for politics and 
political thought seemed to fade. Not so. The Reformation changed Europe in political and 
cultural terms. And, given that the emerging nation-states were the outcome of a political 
alliance of the monarch with the emerging bourgeoisie, the members of this social class 
started to participate in the creation of new institutions. Eventually, with the American and   4 
the French revolutions, not only the fortune of markets but also the times of politics and of 
political thought achieved a new momentum.  
With industrialization, the capitalist revolution in England was completed, and shortly 
thereafter in France and in the United States. The new market economy required a non-
arbitrary political regime: a liberal state, respectful of property rights and contracts, in 
which the rule of law prevailed, but not necessarily a democratic one. Political 
philosophers were still far away from democracy; they lived in absolute monarchies, and, 
realistically, saw the liberal or constitutional state, not democracy, as the alternative form 
of political regime. The absolute monarchies, however, were already a manifestation of the 
capitalist revolution, and, with Thomas Hobbes and the social contract theory, the 
legitimacy of political power was transferred from tradition or from divine right to the 
people. After that, a new breed of enlightened or liberal political philosophers emerged. 
Liberalism is originally the ideology of the bourgeoisie, but it involved a larger range of 
interests. After Locke, the first great liberal philosopher, liberal thinkers were 
constitutional monarchists. Liberalism was not an alternative to monarchy, but a form of 
constitutionally limiting the powers of the monarch.  
With the American and the French revolutions, liberal ideology turned dominant, but the 
word and the demand for “democracy”, long forgotten, returned to public debate. In the 
American Revolution, democracy was rejected, and, as John Dunn (2005: 72-73) remarks, 
only in retrospect, as America’s new constitution was put to work, and after Alexis de 
Tocqueville explained Americans to themselves, did the new nation view itself as a 
democracy. In the French Revolution, there was a radical democratic project, which 
proved self-defeating in the hands of the Jacobins. Jürgen Habermas (1988: 465), writing 
on the French Revolution and on the dialectic between liberalism  and democracy, 
emphasizes, “democracy and human rights form the universalistic core of the 
constitutional state that emerged from the American and French Revolutions in different 
variants”. However, such a universalistic core would take a century to become reality. 
After the two revolutions, liberals often identified democracy with the worst excesses of 
the French Revolution, or as the dictatorship of the majority. In light of their historical 
experience, liberal political philosophers – such as Benjamin Constant – remained hostile 
to democracy, which would entail instability and disorder, thus demonstrating the inherent 
incapacity of the people to govern. Even Rousseau, who is usually associated with 
democracy, was not really in favor of modern, i.e., representative, democracy. Being a   5 
citizen of the republican city-state of Geneva, he believed only in direct democracy. For 
large empires, or even in nation-states, he had the same view as Montesquieu: government 
was much more complex and difficult, and there was no alternative to a kind of despotism. 
Rousseau would not accept the basic criterion distinguishing liberal from liberal-
democratic regimes: the inclusion of women and the poor as citizens.  
The liberals, who had been the dominant political philosophers since the eighteenth 
century, favored democracy only in the twentieth century. Before that, they feared it: they 
were worried that the poor would expropriate the rich and cause disorder. They accepted 
the liberal politicians' policy of granting voting rights to the people, but gradually, slowly. 
One reason for this, according to Norberto Bobbio (1991: 26), was the classic conflict 
between reason and democracy.  
In the great tradition of Western political thought, which began in Greece, the 
assessment of democracy, viewed as one of the three ideal forms of government, has 
been preponderantly negative: an assessment that is based on the assumption that 
democratic government, more than the others, is dominated by passions. As can be 
seen, exactly the opposite to reason.  
In the second part of the nineteenth century, however, things began to change. For the 
market economy, a liberal political regime was not enough for protecting property rights 
and contracts. Democracy, which used to be a pejorative word, gradually underwent a 
transformation. In mid-nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill, following indications already 
existing in the work of Jeremy Bentham and of his own father, James Mill was one of the 
first major philosophers to endorse democracy. Before that, we can also see a democratic 
tendency in Thomas Paine and in Tocqueville. According to C. B. Macpherson (1965: 1-2, 
9) pressure from those who had no vote but were part of the market process became 
irresistible; on the other hand, writing in the mid-1960s, he noted that “democracy used to 
be a bad word… Then, within fifty years, democracy became a good thing. Its full 
acceptance into the ranks of respectability was apparent by the time of the First World 
War”.  
Beginning in the more advanced nation-states  at the end of the nineteenth century, 
universal suffrage was finally accorded in each country. Since the other requisite to 
democracy had been reasonably achieved by the liberal state, this was the historical new 
fact that completed the transition to democracy. As Pierre Rosanvallon (1992: 16) 
underlines in his history of the universal suffrage in France, “the universal suffrage is a 
kind of sacrament of the equality among men… it represents a fulfillment, the entry in a 
new age of the politic”.    6 
Short review on democratic transitions 
There is a long tradition of research and thought on democratic transitions and 
consolidations that begins with Seymour Lipset (1959) and Philip Cutright (1963), uses an 
historical approach following loosely either Weber (modernization theory) or Marx 
(structural theory). Lipset’s classic paper on development and democracy shows that the 
more advanced an economy is, the more democratic it will tend to be. Lipset uses theories 
of modernization, and stresses the importance of education – which is indeed important, 
but not enough to explain why democracy became the preferred form of government only 
in the twentieth century. In fact, his seminal paper establishes a correlation, not a causal 
connection. A series of other studies confirmed Lipset’s original finding, but remained 
inconclusive in relation to the underlying cause.  
In studying democratic transitions and consolidation, there are two alternative approaches 
to the historical one. The major study by O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) on 
democratic transitions emphasized the particularities of each country in which the 
transition to, or the consolidation of, democracy took place, and attributed a major role to 
individuals and to the process through which authoritarian elites split between “soft liners” 
and “hardliners”, a process that eventually led to the victory of the former. According to 
this approach, democracy is the result of changes in political institutions, processes, and 
leadership. The alternative is the rational choice approach, but, in so far as it is 
hypothetical-deductive and ignores history, it is by definition unable to explain historical 
facts. The former approach is too specific and involves a leadership aspect; the latter is too 
general; and both fail to consider the new historical facts and the structural and cultural 
conditions behind institutional change.  
These two approaches derive from Dankwart Rustow’s 1970 paper on transitions, which 
rejected the quite reasonable assumption that the causes of democratization are also the 
causes of consolidation. Rustow thereby created space for choice or agency; but this kind 
of approach either leads to abstract rational models like those used in neoclassical 
economics where choice becomes mere maximization, or ends up in case-by-case studies 
that lack predictive capacity. More recently, Charles Boix (2003), Boix and Stokes (2003) 
and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2006) made contributions to the democratic 
transition issues that are related to the argument in this paper and made knowledge on the 
subject to advance, but they just show that democracy is less threatening to the rich when 
economic development takes place, while my argument is historical: is that the capitalist   7 
class is the first social class not to  veto democracy and, second, that a consolidated 
democracy is only possible after the capitalist revolution takes place.
 3
This paper is part of the tradition of thought, the historical one that looks for new historical 
facts and for the structural, cultural and institutional determinants of social and political 
action. It is akin to approaches by Seymour Lipset (1959) and Barrington Moore (1966), 
Robert Dahl (1971), Samuel Huntington (1991), Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber 




Two concepts: democracy and capitalist revolution 
 Yet Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens observed that “the causal 
forces that stand behind the relationship between development and democracy remain, in 
effect, in a black box” (1992: 29). In fact, capitalist development and democracy appear 
together but there is no clear explanation why. I hope to offer in this paper a contribution 
toward opening the black box and toward understanding democratic consolidation.  
In late nineteenth or early twentieth century the more economically advanced countries 
adopted universal suffrage, and democracy became finally dominant. Table 1 presents the 
first countries to adopt universal suffrage up to the 1940s. The first was New Zealand, in 
1893. The adoption of the universal right to vote does not mean that a country has 
completed its transition to democracy, but in most advanced countries this was the case. 
Such countries had constitutional or rule-of-law regimes. Freedom of thought and 
association and regular elections had also existed for some time. When the propertyless 
and women were finally entitled to vote, the minimum conditions for democracy 
materialized. As Wanderley G. Santos (1998) observes, the number of voters doubled, or 
more than doubled, in most countries in the year that universal suffrage is adopted. The 
fact that democracy is a twentieth century phenomenon is quite clear from Table 1. The 
question is why only at that moment democracy became a viable form of government. 
Table 1: The First Countries to Adopt Universal Suffrage (up to the 1940s) 
Year  Country 
1893  New Zealand 
1902  Australia 
1906  Finland 
1913  Norway 
1915  Denmark and Iceland 
1918  Austria and Luxembourg  
1919  Germany and the Netherlands   8 
1920  United States 
1921  Canada and Sweden 
1923  Ireland and Uruguay 
1928  United Kingdom 
1929  Ecuador 
1931  Sri Lanka 
1932  Brazil 
1934  Cuba 
1937  Philippines 
1942  Dominican Republic 
1944  Jamaica 
1945  Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary 
1946  France, Japan, Turkey, Poland, Albany, Romany, 
Panama, and Malta 
1947  Argentina, Venezuela, and Pakistan,  
1948  Belgium, Israel, South Korea, and Suriname  
1949  Chile and Costa Rica 
Sources: Santos (1998) and the Laboratory of Experimental Studies based on Nohlen (1993), 
Gorvin (1989), and Lane, McKay and Newton (1997). 
It is time, now, to define two basic concepts that are in the core of this paper: the concept 
of democracy and of capitalist revolution. Democracy is the political regime in which all 
adult citizens vote (universal suffrage), elections are free and regular, and the constitution 
assures the rule of law involving principally freedom of association, of speech and of 
information, and protection of minority rights. In other words, I understand as democratic 
the political regime that satisfies Dahl’s criteria defining a polyarchy (1971; 1989: 233).
5 
This is a “minimal” concept of democracy, and corresponds to the first historical form of 
democracy  –  liberal democracy. As political development takes place, the quality of 
democracy is expected to improve, but we need a minimal concept of democracy to 
distinguish authoritarian from democratic rule and be able to discuss democratic transition 
and consolidation. In this paper, I do not discuss the quality of democracy.
6
We also need a short definition of capitalist revolution.  The  capitalist revolution 
represented a tectonic shift in the history of civilization. It began with the commercial 
revolution and the emergence of the bourgeoisie,  advanced with the formation of the 
nation-states, and got “completed” in each country with the industrial revolution. It 
involved, at the economic level, the transition from the appropriation of economic surplus 
with the use of direct force by an oligarchy controlling the state to a mode of self-
 When we 
discuss democratic transition and consolidation, we should not expect of democracy more 
than a political regime is able to offer, nor fall back on the old distinction between formal 
and substantive democracy that served to justify authoritarian regimes.   9 
enrichment in a market-coordinated economy; it turned profit into the economic motive, 
and capital accumulation embodying technical progress into the means to that end. At the 
political level, it brought the transition from the absolute state to the liberal state – the one 
that assures the rule of law but is not democratic. At the administrative level, it implied the 
separation of the public from the private patrimony, or, in other words, the transition from 
the patrimonial state, where rent seeking was part of the game, to the modern bureaucratic 
state where rent-seeking turned a disease. With the capitalist revolution, the new nation-
states were able to develop three basic institutions: the modern state apparatus, the legal-
constitutional system, and the national market. At the cultural level, it involved the 
transition from tradition and revelation as sources of knowledge to reason and scientific 
research. The capitalist revolution begins with the emergence of a bourgeois middle class 
in Italian cities since the thirteenth century and “ends” with the formation of the nation-
state and the industrial revolution in late eighteenth century in England. After that we can 
view the capitalist revolution as “completed” in each country where the appropriation of 
economic surplus ceased to take place principally through the control of the state to be 
achieved in the market, or, in Marx’s terms (1864: 1024-25), when “relative” surplus 
value (the one involving technological progress) turns the dominant form of surplus 
appropriation, there is “the real subsumption of labor under capital”, and that society 
arrives at “the specific mode of capitalist production”.
7
Marx made the classical analysis of the capitalist revolution, but, since he was concerned 
with the transition to socialism, he was unable to derive from capitalism its two major 
political consequences: the formation of the nation-states,
  
8  and the emergence of the 
democratic regimes. Barrington Moore (1996: 426) took a step  ahead: he made the 
classical analysis of the bourgeois-democratic revolution – he showed “the English Civil 
War, the French Revolution and the American Civil War as the stages of the bourgeois-
democratic revolution”. Writing one hundred years later, when democracy in England, 
France and United States was consolidate, but the experience of authoritarian or 
totalitarian regimes in other countries was still recent, he asked which had been the 
historical conditions in capitalist development that led to democracy. It was clear to him 
that the capitalist or bourgeois revolution was the central condition. Yet, since this fact 
was already well known when he wrote, his more specific question was which other 
conditions were required – conditions that were present principally in England, and also in 
France and United States, but not in Germany, Japan, Russia, China, or India. His 
innovative response as consequence of a major study for that was that, in the sixteen and   10 
the seventeenth centuries, the advance of commerce and the increased demand of 
absolutist rulers for cash led the English landed aristocracy to turn to a form of 
commercial farming and to a political alliance with the bourgeoisie. His illuminating 
theory relating liberalism and democracy to the emergence of the “gentry” – a numerous 
proprietary stratum below the aristocracy and above the rich peasants and the new 
bourgeoisie – is well known. But he underlines that, above the gentry, the overlords also 
got involved in commercial agriculture and in political coalition with the bourgeoisie. For 
him, to reduce the bourgeois-democratic revolution just to a conflict between these two 
classes won by the bourgeoisie is “a caricature” (p.428). While in a country like Germany, 
the aristocracy conserved throughout the nineteenth century a firm position against 
democracy, Moore underlines that the radical opposition to democracy was a marginal 
current in the British aristocratic class. Yet, he underestimates the liberal resistance to 
democracy in Britain, or in the United States, or in France – a resistance that in name of 
the risk of the “dictatorship of the majority” delayed democracy for a century. 
The basic argument 
In the first democratic countries the transition to democracy was the outcome of four 
historical events, among which the capitalist revolution is the central one. Before capitalist 
revolution, the aristocratic elites exercised an absolute veto over democracy; after it, the 
new bourgeois elites, although not immediately adhering to democracy, ceased to veto it – 
and eventually turned interested in it. Barrington Moore had already remarked this fact. 
Discussing the political coalition of the English bourgeoisie with the landed aristocracy, 
Moore (p. 424) is clear:  
a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has become an indispensable 
element in the growth of parliamentary democracy; no bourgeois, no democracy… 
the English bourgeoisie from the seventeenth through much of the nineteenth century 
had a maximum material interest in human freedom. (p. 418 and 424) 
 It is not my central concern in this paper to discuss the historical conditions that proved to 
be more favorable to liberalism and democracy in some countries than in others. Yet, it is 
central to my argument the claim that bourgeoisie is a class that, differently from the 
previous ruling classes or oligarchies, opposed democracy just for certain time and 
eventually accepted it. Before the capitalist revolution, production was organized at the 
family level, and economic surplus was appropriated through ownership of land and 
particularly by the use of political power to tax people, to reduce them to slavery or   11 
servitude. In order to be rich or to own land one was supposed to be politically powerful, 
to be part of the oligarchy controlling the state. The distribution of income was essentially 
a political question. Land property had also a political origin. Dominant groups 
appropriated economic surplus out of land rent and of war; they fought for booty, they 
enslaved the defeated, or imposed heavy taxes on the colonies, and they appropriated land. 
As society changed from tribal to more complex forms, like city-states and empires, 
taxation became increasingly important. The military aristocracy, with the support of a 
patrimonial bureaucracy and a religious hierarchy, appropriated the economic surplus from 
merchants, while landowners collected rents from peasants. Religious legitimacy was 
always an essential part of the process, but the very existence of empires and dominant 
oligarchies depended on their capacity to retain political power and to wage war. In the 
last form of pre-capitalist state organization, the patrimonial state, taxation was essential to 
finance a court aristocracy and a patrimonial bureaucracy. There was no separation 
between the public and the private patrimonies. The poor, identified since Aristotle as the 
sponsors of democracy, would often press for freedom, for some sort of democracy, but 
the dominant group resisted, resorting to all forms of violence to keep the state under their 
political control. Since markets had just a marginal existence, the only way to distribute 
wealth and income was through the control of the state. Occasionally the people or the 
merchants could gain some power and establish some form of republic, but the interests 
involved in political power would soon corrupt and wipe out the new regime.  
After the industrial revolution signals the culmination of the capitalist revolution for each 
newborn national state, this situation changes dramatically. Now, constitutional and 
market systems coordinate society. Now profits and high salaries gain relevance in making 
people rich, while land rents and taxation lose it. The state continues to have a role in the 
acquisition and distribution of income, but is no longer a condition for the existence of the 
economic elite. It is not easy to determine whether a country underwent its capitalist 
revolution, but besides the formation of the nation state and the industrial revolution, a 
good gauge is whether rent seeking or the patrimonial capture of the state still plays a 
major role in making people rich.  
The capitalist revolution did not create democracy, but made it possible. The new 
capitalist class could now do what the previous dominant classes could not: it had the 
option of not vetoing democracy since the absolute control of the state was no longer a 
necessary condition of its wealth. From this moment on, the fight against authoritarian   12 
regimes gathered pace, the consensus against democracy disappeared. As John Dunn 
(1979: 8) observes, the “dismissal of the viability of democracy was a fair summary of an 
European intellectual consensus which reached back at least to the Principate of Augustus, 
it was a consensus which disappeared with surprising speed between 1776 and 1850 in 
Europe itself”. Thus, everything changed with the crucial historical process that was the 
capitalist revolution. The origins of my argument can be found in the following passage 
from Celso Furtado (1976: 33):  
Two forms of appropriating surplus seem to have existed since the beginning 
of historical times. On one side is what we call the authoritarian form, which 
consists in extracting the surplus through coercion. On the other side we have 
the mercantile form, that is, the appropriation of surplus through exchange… 
The surplus utilized to appropriate another surplus is a capital, which entitles 
us to say that all socio-economic formations in which the surplus is 
predominantly captured through exchange belong to the genus capitalism.  
In the historical moment when  each national society changes from administrative to 
market appropriation of the surplus, the control of the state continued to be necessary to 
the new ruling class, but businessmen could leave the responsibility of governing and of 
protecting militarily the new nation-states from foreign aggression to politicians and 
bureaucrats including professional military men. At this moment, argument and persuasion 
start to prevail over force; the era of politics began. Now, people had the possibility of 
discussing and creating liberal and democratic institutions. The eighteenth century had 
already experienced a hint of it when some thinkers contrasted the harshness of aristocracy 
with the softness of capitalism. Montesquieu, above all, underlined commerce’s 
“douceur”.
9
England was the first country to form a strong nation-state, to make its industrial 
revolution and, so, to complete its capitalist revolution; it is not by accident that it was also 
the European country that was able to reduce to colony the ancient empires of Asia and 
Africa, and first liberal political regime in the world. In the early nineteenth century, 
England was ready for liberalism, not for democracy. The first and fundamental veto on 
democracy by the old oligarchies was not anymore in place, but a second veto – the fear of 
expropriation by the poor – remained strong. Thus, civil rights could be assured, but not 
 Albert Hirschman (1977), commenting on this view, observes that while the 
warrior aristocrats were subject to great and sometimes heroic passions, the bourgeoisie 
was limited to more modest and moderate traits. Analyzing Shaftsbury’s, Hutcheson’s and 
Hume’s analyses, Hirschman shows how these philosophers viewed economic activity as a 
“calm passion”.    13 
political rights. It would take 100 years after the completion of the Industrial Revolution to 
this second veto be eliminated and the English elites admit universal suffrage.  
The three additional new historical facts 
According to this capitalist revolution model of democratic transition and consolidation, 
the fact that profits did not depend on the direct control of the state led the capitalist class 
to suspend the absolute veto on democracy. Yet it would take a century and  three 
additional historical events to make democracy the preferred and widespread political 
regime. The second historical fact was that the bourgeoisie lost fear of expropriation by a 
majority of workers wining elections. The new capitalist class, formed by a large middle 
class and a small upper class, will be originally liberal. Its members strove for profits and 
for the guarantee of their hard-won civil rights. Their memory of the arbitrary rule that 
characterized absolutism was alive and well. With the liberal order, they had ceased to be 
mere subjects to become citizens endowed with rights. Yet, just as it took time for the 
aristocracy to grant full citizenship to the bourgeoisie, so it would take time for the new 
business class to accept that workers had full citizenship by the institution of universal 
suffrage. Although the seeds of democracy were in the liberal state, classical liberals 
fought strenuously democracy. They did so in the name of freedom, with the argument 
that freedom and equality conflicted with one another, that equal rights – which are a 
condition for democracy – would be intrinsically inconsistent with civic liberties, in so far 
as the equality of rights would lead to the tyranny of the majority and the denial of 
freedom. As Charles Lindblom (1977: 163) underlines, the first modern political 
philosophers “are all liberals first, and democrats, second, if at all”.  
The capitalist class’ fear that universal suffrage would bring a dictatorship of the majority 
weakened gradually as the workers participated in elections and did not demonstrate such 
purpose. Workers proved not to be revolutionary: they demanded higher wages, increased 
labor protection, and democracy rather than socialism. Progressively capitalists realized 
that the workers did not vote as a bloc, and that the majority of workers would not vote for 
their expropriation. They observed that democratic politics tended to divide political 
parties ideologically, but the differences among them would tend to be increasingly small 
as they all had to converge to an ideological center identified with capitalism. In other 
words, they saw that a clear tendency to democratic elections involved change of policies 
but not of economic regime.    14 
While the first and the second new historical facts that opened the way for democracy 
were on the supply side of democratic participation, the third and the fourth were on the 
demand side: the demand of the middle classes and of the working class. The rise of the 
middle classes – a bourgeois middle class, and a professional middle class – is the third 
new historical fact contributing to the historical process of democratic transition and 
consolidation that occurs in the twentieth century. The existence of this large layer 
between the rich and the poor worked as a main stabilizing factor thus circumventing the 
classical problem of early democracies: political instability.
10
The fourth and final historical fact that led modern societies to democracy was the 
pressure of the poor or of the working class for democracy. Despite all their internal 
contradictions, democracy was always a demand of the poor when they were able to 
express themselves politically. Integrated in large factories under the capitalist system, 
part of the poor turned into the working or salaried class, became better organized and 
more demanding. They demanded higher wages, increased labor protection, and 
democracy. Goran Therborn’s essay on this subject (1977) is still the basic reference; Ruth 
Collier’s 1999 book on the working class and elites in Western Europe and South America 
offers a major contribution to the theme. According to Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens (1992: 8) “the working class was the most consistently pro-democracy force… 
The landed upper classes, which were dependent on a large supply of cheap labor, were 
the most consistently anti-democratic force. The bourgeoisie we found to be generally 
supportive of the installation of constitutional and representative regime, but opposed 
extending political inclusion to the lower classes”. When democracy won, it was a victory 
of the poor. Yet, I do not view the demand of workers or of the poor as the central cause of 
democracy; that was, rather, whether or not the elites kept their veto over it. It was only 
after the ruling classes relaxed it that the role of the poor, and also of the middle classes 
demanding more participation, became strategic.  
 After the completion of the 
capitalist revolution, the bourgeoisie was a large middle class that required, besides the 
guarantee of civil rights, formal rules that permitted its members to participate in 
government. Democracy emerged eventually as the ensemble of such rules. With the 
advance of industrialization, a new professional middle class also emerged, and the two 
middle classes began to represent an increasing share of the total population – and they 
also demanded democracy. Besides, the fact that they were situated between the rich and 
the poor was also a reason for the rich to be less fearful of the poor and accept universal 
suffrage.   15 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the arguments against universal suffrage or on the 
risk of the dictatorship of majority had lost their force, while the demand for democracy 
increased, and the first countries that granted the universal suffrage became the first real 
democracies.
11
A posteriori rational motives 
  As Dahl (1989: 234) asserts, “although some of the institutions of 
polyarchy appeared in a number of English-speaking and European countries in the 
nineteenth century, in no country did the demos become inclusive until the twentieth 
century”. 
Although democracy was originally a demand from the poor or the working class and the 
middle classes, it became gradually a rational option for the rich, provided that the liberal 
principles associated to the rule of law prevailed in the new democratic system. Besides 
realizing that democracy did not really endanger property and profits, the capitalist class 
became conscious that a democratic regime could be more stable, more effective in 
assuring social order, than just a liberal state. Since capitalism was not a zero-sum game as 
it was a permanent source of new wealth, the bourgeoisie realized that democracy 
mitigated by liberalism – liberal democracy – would adequately protect their interests 
regardless the fact that it also protected the poor and the middle classes.  
In endorsing democracy, the rich lost political power, but in a limited way. They knew 
they could count on conservative and even on social-democratic political parties to protect 
their property rights since – as Adam Przeworski (1985) classically noted, they kept veto 
power on investment and economic growth. On the other hand, they kept control of the 
form of financing electoral campaigns, and of the media. They compromised on political 
power but not on liberal political values and principles: they made sure that the protection 
of minority and civil rights remained core elements in each national constitution.  
This capitalist revolution model of transition and consolidation of democracy makes sense 
on two conditions: first, the understanding on the part of workers that a socialist revolution 
was not rational; second, that a satisfactory long-term rate of profit was assured to 
capitalists. Adam Przeworski (1985: 139, 177, 180) argues persuasively for the workers’ 
rationality in refusing to support a socialist revolution. According to him, workers in 
advanced democracies had strong motives to feel no attraction for a revolution 
expropriating the rich; if workers had the right to vote, they would rationally vote for 
socialist political parties committed to the socialist revolution. Yet they do not, because,   16 
on one hand, as long as capitalists control investments, they “are in a unique position in 
the capitalist system: they represent the future universal interests while interests of all 
other groups appear as particularistic and hence inimical to future developments”. On the 
other hand, according to Przeworski, workers did not have the assurance that moving to 
socialism would immediately improve their material conditions. On the contrary, they are 
not certain that socialism is more efficient than capitalism and, even if it is, the transition 
to socialism may involve a deterioration of workers’ welfare. Thus, he concludes, since 
“workers have the option of improving their material condition by cooperating with 
capitalists, the socialist orientation cannot be deduced from the material interests of 
workers”.  
The second condition making this explanation of democratic transitions and consolidations 
– that capitalist development keeps the rate of profit at a satisfactory level, or, in Herbert 
Simons’ (1957) words, at a satisfying long-run level (that keeps entrepreneurs innovating 
and investing) – is an empirical fact. After the industrial revolution, the rate of profit did 
not fall as predicted by the classical economists but kept reasonably constant at a 
satisfactory level from the point of view of investing entrepreneurs. On the theoretical 
level, Bresser-Pereira (1986; 2004), in his model of growth and distribution, argued that, 
contrarily to the classical distribution theory, the rate of profit should be viewed as given 
or constant in the long-term growth process, while the wage rate should be seen as the 
residuum. Proceeding from this inversion of the classical distribution model, he showed 
that wages may increase at an equal, or at a higher rate than the increase in productivity 
while keeping the rate of profit at a reasonably satisfactory level provided that technical 
progress is neutral, or capital saving (only in the beginning of industrialization technical 
progress tends to be capital using). Thus, technical progress facilitates that the rate of 
profit is kept satisfactory and constant. Given that a satisfactory rate of profit is a required 
condition for businessmen to invest and the economy to grow, capitalist societies develop 
technologies, institutions, and ideologies that assure it. Workers soon realize that a 
satisfactory rate of profit is condition for the increase of their real wages, that the game 
between the rich and the poor is not a win-loss game, but a win-win game that makes 
capitalism more legitimate and democracy less threatening than it was initially thought. 
These two conditions reinforce one another. On the one hand, workers had no rational 
motive to put their bets on the socialist revolution; on the other, as wages increased at 
approximately the same rate of productivity, they had good reason to keep participating in   17 
the economic system. The fact that the workers, eventually, had no better option was 
perceived not only by them but also by capitalists. Thus, as long as the latter understood 
this, they saw less and less reason to fear democracy. On the contrary, they became 
increasingly confident in democracy. The increase in the direct and social benefits entailed 
by democracy would not be a burden as long as they did not threaten the long-run rate of 
profit. Wage increases could sustain the rate of profit to the extent that they maintained 
effective demand, as Keynes demonstrated. As it became rational for workers individually, 
not just as a class, to support capitalism and to fight for democracy and for social rights, it 
also became rational for capitalists to support democracy. Workers increasingly 
understood the limits of their wage demands, while capitalists increasingly became 
persuaded that democracy could facilitate workers’ demands but, as a trade-off, provide a 
legitimate political system more able than authoritarian rule to assure political stability. In 
addition, capitalists realized that democracy made the rule of law much more secure – and 
nothing is more  important for business activity than a stable constitutional and legal 
environment.  
In this model, the rise of a large bourgeois middle class and of a larger professional middle 
class entered as a moderating factor reducing the conflict between the rich and the poor. 
Yet, if we understand that these two middle strata are part of the expanded ruling class that 
characterizes modern societies, we immediately realize that there is here an additional and 
relevant argument in favor of democracy. Being much larger than the old aristocracy, the 
new ruling class formed by the rich and the upper middle classes need institutions 
permitting groups within it to share political power or to rotate in government in an 
orderly way. Under these circumstances, democracy was the obvious rational choice, 
collectively and for each member. Democratic institutions created conditions for the 
resolution of their internal conflicts. Aristocratic groups, though plagued by internal and 
murderous struggles, were always small. They solved their conflicts personally. The 
emerging capitalist class, being large, had in democracy a better and more secure way of 
resolving its conflicts.  
The arguments brought by Charles Boix (2003), Boix and Stokes (2003) and Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2006) to the democratic transition’s issue are of a more strictly rational 
choice nature because they intend to find a priori rational motives.
 These authors argue 
that economic development causes democracy because when income distribution is more 
equal the elites’ fear of redistribution, particularly through the imposition of higher taxes   18 
on the rich, will wane. This argument is in the same vein as the argument presented here in 
so far as it offers an economic explanation, but the similarity stops at this point. First, in 
relating democracy to economic development and income distribution it is assumed that 
there is a linear relation between the latter two variables, which is not the case. As Edward 
Muller (1997) showed, based on his own research and on many others’, the relationship 
between economic development and inequality takes the form of a U- shaped curve, but 
the last 30 years showed that even this simple relationship can’t be assured as inequality 
again increased. Second, in distinguishing the capitalist revolution model here presented 
from simple rational choice models, it is necessary to consider that, besides being 
economic, the model is political and historical. It uses rational arguments only a 
posteriori, considering new historical facts, while standard rational choice arguments and 
research are unable to take history into consideration. According to Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006: XII) “since democracy will bring a shift of power in favor of citizens, 
why should the elite ever create such a set of institutions? We argue that this only occurs 
because the disenfranchised citizens can threaten the elite and force it to make 
concessions”. This is too simple and does not explain too much. It says that democracy 
was won by the poor, or, more precisely, by the working class and the emerging new 
middle classes. But why did they win? Or, to what extent their demand was eventually co-
opted by the capitalist class? On the other hand, if economic reasoning is in place, why not 
distinguish the loss of political power that the rich effectively suffered with the advent of 
democracy from the increased political stability that they gained – or, in other words, from 
the increased possibility of regularly achieving a satisfactory rate of profit? 
Predicting democratic transition and consolidation 
The capitalist revolution model here presented is useful to predict the overall transition to 
democracy, but when individual cases are examined, there are many exceptions. As Ruth 
Collier (1999: 20) argues, many are the paths to democracy. Foreign influence may lead to 
democratic transitions that otherwise would not occur (consider Haiti, for instance), or, on 
the opposite side, successful authoritarian rulers may stay in government much beyond 
what the evolution of economic and social variables would lead us to predict, as in the 
case of Singapore. Today there is a large number of countries that, not having completed 
their capitalist revolution, are still democratic – either because of foreign pressure, or/and 
because nationals also don’t see better alternative.    19 
The model presented in this paper assumes that the same theory should explain transitions 
and democratic consolidation, but it is more solid in the second than in the first ground.. 
Historically, a full change from state to market appropriation of the economic surplus is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for democratic consolidation, not for democratic 
transition. No country experienced democratic consolidation before having changed the 
coordination of the economy from the state to  the market, and having reduced 
substantially the patrimonial aspects of its state, but the same cannot be said in relation to 
democratic transitions, because they often result from pressures from other and more 
powerful countries and from imitation.  
The capitalist revolution model here presented is effective in predicting that an increasing 
number of countries will turn democratic as they grow and complete their capitalist 
revolutions, but fails to be a secure case by case predictor of democratic transitions. In the 
case of democratic consolidation, however, the model is also strong on a country by 
country basis. After a country with the necessary conditions for democracy undergoes 
democratic transition, its democracy is consolidated: the probability that it will fall back 
into authoritarian rule turns vanishingly small. The tragic failure of the Weimar democracy 
in Germany is an exception to this rule. After the defeat in World War I, the transition to 
democracy took place in a country that had already completed its capitalist revolution in 
the times of Bismarck; nevertheless, it fell back to authoritarian rule a few years later, with 
the support of the German nation. How can we explain that? Was fascism or nazism the 
necessary outcome of late capitalist revolutions, as some argued? Or was it a reaction to 
the communist revolution in Russia? I believe that the first explanation is outright wrong, 
while the second makes more sense in Germany and Italy where the capitalist revolution 
had just ended and where strong socialist political parties were around. I believe that 
Mussolini’s fascism was eventually a reaction to the fear of communism, but it does not 
represent an exception to the capitalist revolution theory because previously to fascism 
Italy could hardly be called a democracy. As to the Weimar republic, it was democratic, 
but we cannot say that the German people “conquered democracy” in 1919; actually, 
democracy  was the outcome of a defeat in a major war. Immediately after the new 
democracy, Germany was miserably treated by the winning countries in the Versailles 
Treaty, and experienced hyperinflation in the following years. Thus, when Adolph Hitler 
took power, he profited from a deep resentment of the German people to assume full 
political power and resume war. World War II was a continuation of the first one.    20 
Theories on democratic consolidation usually list the characteristics that are common to 
consolidated democracies, instead of explaining democratic consolidation. In relation to 
democratic consolidation, we find the same theoretical dividing line between the historical 
or socio-economic approach and the processes and leadership approach that exists in the 
discussion of democratic transitions. Radical manifestations of the process and leadership 
approach turn democratic consolidations void of historical content: are just lists of 
consolidation requirements. Scott Mainwaring (1992: 327) is right when he notes that “the 
most important dividing line in contemporary work on democracy is between those who 
see it primarily as a result of propitious economic, social, or cultural conditions and those 
who see it primarily as a result of political institutions, processes, and leadership”. 
Looking for the causes of the increased survivability of democracies in Latin America, 
Mainwaring (2000) sees three factors explaining it: “the first explanation evolves around 
the structural transformations unleashed by modernization… second, from left to right of 
the spectrum, political attitudes changed… Finally, international support for democracy, 
especially from the United States, increased…” This approach, as the one adopted by Linz 
and Stepan (1996) with the help of four types of non-democratic regime whose 
characteristics would influence decisively the transition and consolidation paths, is also a 
historical approach to democratic consolidation consistent with the view presented here.  
In the growing literature on democratic transition, Gerard Alexander’s (2002: 57) presents 
a broad picture of the consolidation process. He defines a central question: “what leads the 
rich to expect its well-being and safety to be predictably better secured in democracy than 
under authoritarian rule?” The question is in agreement with the model presented in this 
paper, because it locates the problem in the preferences of the rich or of the capitalist class 
toward democracy, and because Alexander shows that this class may rationally change its 
preferences as new factors emerge. As it happened in Brazil in the early 1960s, democracy 
was not rational for the business class, but it became rational – more able to meet that 
class’s need for economic well-being and security – after the late 1970s. Yet, as Alexander 
does not adopt an historical approach, he does not have an answer to the question he 
correctly poses.  
According to the capitalist revolution model, when a country makes its transition to 
democracy after having completed its industrial revolution, we may predict that it will 
probably remain democratic, because only a country that fulfilled this condition will have 
the social structure, the political culture and the required institutions for a consolidated   21 
democracy. A country may try to import democratic institutions, but it is impossible either 
to import the social structure and the culture that makes democracy rational to economic 
and political elites, or to import the respective democratic culture that is necessary to a 
consolidated regime.  The more fully capitalist is a country, the more consolidated its 
democratic regime will tend to be.  
The research by Adam Przeworski and associates (2000) on economic development and 
democracy offers a definitive substantiation for the strong relation between capitalist 
revolution and democratic consolidation. In their study of democracy for the period 1950-
1990, they concluded that there is no relationship between levels of economic 
development and transitions to democracy. The claim is radical, but concurs with the 
caveat that I have already made, namely, that in predicting democratic transitions the 
completion of the capitalist revolution faces many exceptions deriving from earlier 
transitions. Yet, from their research we can infer that democratic consolidation is strongly 
associated with economic development. Besides showing the positive relation between 
economic development and democratic consolidation, they claim, based solidly on their 
data that “where they are established, democracies are much more likely to endure in more 
highly developed countries”: in rich democracies (above US$6,000.00 per capita, per 
annum) they conclude that the probability that the regime will fall back into dictatorship is 
practically zero. If we accept that the assumption that non-oil exporting countries with per 
capita incomes above US$6,000.00 per annum have completed their capitalist revolution 
(a reasonable or conservative assumption), it follows that the completion of the 
modernization process implies democratic consolidation.  
Conclusion 
One can say that the hypothesis here developed – the capitalist revolution model relating 
democracy and economic development – is not empirically falseable due to the difficulty 
of defining the moment when a country completes its capitalist revolution. Yet, I believe 
that there is already sufficient evidence that this claim is true. Historical experience 
abundantly shows that, after a country completes its capitalist revolution, it will tend to 
become democratic; subsequently, when it becomes democratic, its democracy will be 
consolidated. But, besides this general historical experience, would we dispose of some 
stronger evidence that a country that completed the historical requirements for democracy, 
and democratized, will not fall back into authoritarianism? This is an interpretative paper   22 
using a broad brush to identify a common long-term trajectory. I have not carried out new 
research on the subject. The evidence already available, however, strongly supports the 
hypothesis presented here on the consolidation of democracy. The entire literature linking 
democracy with economic development actually supports it. After the classic paper by 
Lipset, all the research confirmed the basic finding.  
Summing up, democratic transition was the outcome of four historical new facts all related 
to the capitalist revolution, involving the removal of the two vetoes exercised by the rich. 
Additionally, the argument developed here depends on two conditions: workers’ lack of 
commitment to a socialist revolution, and the long-run constancy of the rate of profit while 
wages and salaries rise with productivity. When a country satisfies all these requirements 
and transition takes place, the resulting democracy will be a consolidated one. The same 
theory that explains why democracy became widespread in the twentieth century explains 
consolidation more specifically, country by country.  
The model of democratic consolidation presented here does not establish a definite causal 
connection. Yet it shows that in a society where profits and salaries earned in the market 
become the dominant forms of surplus appropriation – the main indicator that the capitalist 
revolution in a given country has been completed –  elites cease to veto democracy. 
Subsequently, as voting rights start to be extended to the poor, capitalist elites realize that 
this change does not really threaten property rights and contracts. Workers, in their turn, 
increase their demands for political participation, but in a moderately manner. Eventually, 
elites realize, based on their own and other countries’ experience, that democracy 
promotes their interests better than authoritarian regimes: it is more stable and provides 
rules for its many members to share and rotate power. The middle classes, who grow 
extraordinarily, feel the same. In other words, after an industrial revolution makes the 
appropriation of the economic surplus dependent not on state control but on the market, 
authoritarian regimes cease to be attractive to capitalists. In a second moment, the 
professional class receiving salaries instead of wages grows and shares power with the 
capitalists. It too has no reason to prefer authoritarianism. Eventually, democracy becomes 
rational for all classes, despite the dissatisfaction that sharing power always causes.  
What is the relevance of the theory presented in this paper? First, it permits us to better 
understand the past. With it, we understand why democracy became the preferred and 
widespread form of government only in the twentieth century. Second, we understand why 
democracy was consolidated initially in the countries that first underwent capitalist   23 
revolutions, i.e., England, France and the United States. Third, we have now a criterion to 
predict whether a country making its transition to democracy will end up with a 
consolidated democracy. If it emerges endogenously, as an outcome of the capitalist 
revolution and the overcoming of the fear of expropriation, it will be consolidated, 
whereas if it is the outcome of external pressure or of the attempt by local elites to imitate 
the institutions of the more advanced societies, it will not.  
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1 In this paper I assume the existence, today, of three types of countries: rich, middle income and 
poor countries. Rich and middle income countries are the ones that are already fully or completely 
capitalist; poor countries are the ones that are attempting to make their national and industrial 
revolution (their capitalist revolution) but did not get to it yet.  
2 For instance, in the printed edition of The Economist that I just read (December 11
th 2010), there 
was a report on recent coups in Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. In Latin 
America, poor countries that elect left-wing presidents are permanently threatened by coups d´Etat.  
3 For a recent survey on transitions to democracy from a rational choice standpoint, see Barbara 
Geddes (2007).  
4 I used this approach originally in 1978 to analyze and predict the Brazilian transition to 
democracy that would occur eight years later. I assumed that Brazil had already completed its   26 
                                                                                                                                                   
capitalist revolution. Yet, due to the 1959 Cuban revolution, and the political radicalization that 
followed, the Brazilian bourgeoisie opted, in 1964, for an authoritarian regime. Thirteen years 
later, however, this fear had disappeared, and the capitalist class gradually joined forces with the 
other sources of democratic pressure (Bresser-Pereira, 1978; 1984).  
5 Although I believe that Dahl’s distinction between modern democracy and polyarchy is useful in 
certain circumstances to distinguish an ideal form of government from reality, and also from Greek 
democracy, note that in this paper I use “modern democracy” or just “democracy” and “polyarchy” 
as synonyms. 
6 Guillermo O’Donnell (2004) wrote an encompassing essay on the quality of democracy. 
7 We also read in Marx (1864: 1035): “With the real subsumption of labor under capital a complete 
(and constantly repeated) revolution takes place in the mode of production, in the productivity of 
the workers and in the relations between workers and capitalists”. In Marx’s dialectical terms, in 
this moment, when technological progress turns inherent to capitalist production, the capitalist 
revolution is completed, but it is always in movement, it is always and necessarily changing. 
8 The first task – to derive from the capitalist revolution the nation-state – was principally done by 
Charles Tilly (1975, 1992). 
9 According to Montesquieu (1748: 609) “où il y a du commerce, il y a de moeurs doux” 
(“wherever there is commerce, manners are soft”). 
10 The main reason why the classical philosophers view democracy negatively was the fact that 
this political regime was unstable and, so, inclined to demagoguery. 
11 In the United States, universal manhood suffrage had existed since the first part of the 
nineteenth century, probably because the Americans were the first to shake off the fear of 
expropriation. 